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Article
Associational Standing for Cities
KAITLIN AINSWORTH CARUSO
Both states and private associations have well-established standing to
assert claims in federal court based on harm to their constituents. Cities,
though they have much in common with both states and associations, are
generally denied that very sort of representational standing. That denial
unnecessarily squelches local engagement and cities’ ability to address
issues central to their and their constituents’ well-being. This Article
contends that denying representational standing to cities is not only
unjustified, it is unnecessary—there is ample room for municipalities to
sue under the existing doctrine of associational standing.
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Associational Standing for Cities
KAITLIN AINSWORTH CARUSO∗
I. INTRODUCTION
As those mourning the recent fate of class-action litigation and
arbitration are quick to point out, Americans are often exposed to
substantial harms that they are unlikely or unable to fully remedy on their
own.1 Local governments are well situated to find and tackle some of those
harms. The myriad ways in which municipal governments interact with
their residents each day give them an excellent vantage point for
recognizing patterns of harm affecting their communities. Simply by
performing their ordinary functions—running a hospital or identifying
blighted properties—cities become potent information aggregators.
Moreover, because a city’s welfare is intimately intertwined with that of its
residents, we might expect it to take remedial action, including suing to
protect its residents from things like fraud, public nuisance, and
infringement of their rights. And in fact, in recent years, cities have shown
considerable interest in engaging on the large, thorny issues that impact
their residents—like gun violence, climate change, and predatory lending.
In many such cases, aggregate litigation is especially important, because
the issue is of the sort that residents are unable or unlikely to litigate
effectively on their own, as the harm may be moderate and widespread, or
the expense of litigation too great.
There is a problem, however. Virtually no one would dispute that
states typically have the right to sue on behalf of their residents in federal
court. It seems beyond cavil, too, that private associations (often nonprofit
organizations) can, and routinely do, bring federal suits to protect their
∗

Kaitlin Caruso is a former Fellow and Lecturer at Yale Law School. J.D. 2010, Yale Law
School. The opinions in this Article should not be ascribed to any current or former employer. Many
thanks to Amanda Andrade, Erin Bernstein, Joseph Blocher, Eric Brunstad, Heather Gerken, Kathleen
Morris, the students of the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the hardworking editors of
the Connecticut Law Review for their helpful comments on this Article and for ongoing discussions of
local government power and capacity. Above all, this Article would not exist without the help and
support of my husband, Phil Caruso.
1
See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 624–30 (2012) (noting the extensive history
of private suits over public harms in America, the particular reliance on modern class action litigation,
and the modest prospects for class action post-Concepcion); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class
Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770–71, 780, 794 (2012) (discussing the
power of class actions to bring together the less powerful and Concepcion’s damage to it).
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members’ interests. But despite the fact that cities have much in common
with both states on the one hand and associations on the other, standing for
cities to litigate on behalf of their residents is “a quagmire”— especially so
in federal court.2 Because federal courts often do not know whether to treat
cities like sovereigns or corporations, they treat them as neither, denying
them standing and leaving them unable to speak for their residents who
have suffered harm.3
From the perspective of the residents whose rights are at stake, cities
may offer distinct advantages over the state attorneys general and private
entities that often take up consumer protection and rights-based fights.
Especially on sensitive or politically contentious issues, there may be a
local consensus long before a statewide one, and so the city may be easier
to mobilize to action than a state. And relative to litigating nonprofits or
class-action counsel, cities may in some cases face a lower substantive
burden (as in public nuisance), and may possess special expertise by virtue
of their widely varying interactions with their residents.
Without standing to litigate on residents’ behalf, many cities strain to
identify harm to their own interests in order to bring a suit, only to find
their efforts blocked by claims that the offensive conduct is too remote
from the city’s injury and the connection between the two is too tenuous.4
Others may attempt non-litigation responses to the problem, but discover
that they have far too few resources to clean up after bad conduct that they
cannot sue to stop. Still others simply hope that someone else will take up
the fight. This additional standing burden on cities is unjustified.
Fortunately, it is also remediable under existing standing doctrine.
I have previously suggested that both cities and federal courts might
benefit if the current common law concerning cities’ (lack of) capacity
were replaced with the ordinary law of corporations, and I offered
associational standing as an example of what cities stand to gain by the
2
Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 389 (2006).
3
See Id.at 370 (“Cities asserting standing in their quasi-sovereign or proprietary capacities face
several potential hurdles. The most formidable is federal courts’ refusal to confer quasi-sovereign
standing on cities.”). Throughout this Article, I generally refer to cities, local governments, and
municipalities interchangeably. In doing so, I intend not to draw a distinction between, say, central
cities and suburbs, but between general and special-purpose local governments (e.g. between townships
and water districts). As discussed below, special-purpose governments present distinct questions for
associational standing, and as such are largely beyond the scope of this Article.
4
See Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Berretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d
Cir. 2001) (discussing the long chain of events that led to the city’s alleged injury); City of
Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 WL 8652915, at *1, *4–5 (N.D. Ala. Aug.
19, 2009) (finding that where injuries to the City are “too tenuously connected,” they are “not fairly
traceable” to the misconduct); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 33–34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003) (identifying similar cases in both state and federal court dismissed for these reasons,
including Camden County).
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change. Here, I take up the work that that rough sketch left unfinished: a
deeper analysis of the fit between cities and the doctrine of associational
standing, and a close look at the costs and benefits municipal associational
standing offers for cities, their residents, and the federal system as a
whole.6
Certainly, cities differ in a number of respects from the trade
associations and area-focused nonprofit corporations that often invoke the
doctrine of associational standing. We do not typically think of city
residents as city “members,” for starters. City residents do, however, have
many of the “indicia of membership” developed in the case law, and where
one lives may be just as salient to one’s identity as the groups to which one
donates.7 Cities may also serve a constituency that is more heterogeneous
than that of other associations, and so could face internal disputes. This
problem is not truly unique to cities, however, and local democratic
processes, as well as the case-by-case assessment inherent in standing
doctrine, can adequately protect possible dissenters. Finally, as a generalpurpose government, a city may struggle to convince a court that a given
case is germane to its core purposes (a necessary precursor to asserting
associational standing). But especially when the harms leveled at city
residents fall very close to the core competencies of local government, like
health or property values, cities as natural information aggregators may be
uniquely suited to effectively press such claims. Accordingly, I side with
those courts that have concluded that, at least in some cases, cities can
properly invoke associational standing on behalf of their residents.
II. A BRIEF NOTE ON STANDING
Under the now-familiar tests of Article III standing, a plaintiff must as
a constitutional matter establish that she has suffered an
“injury in fact[,]” that is, “an invasion of a legally protected interest” which
is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent.8 The injury
must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and it
5
Kaitlin A. Caruso, Colloquium, The Municipal Corporation, Revisited: Rationalizing the Law of
Cities After Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (2011), available at
http://harvardcrcl.org/cr-cl-presents-a-colloquium-the-case-for-local-constitutional-enforcement/.
6
Recently, the Supreme Court cast doubt on whether it will continue to treat questions of thirdparty standing as true questions of standing as opposed to, say, questions regarding the scope of a
particular cause of action. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1386, 1387 n.3 (2014). For present purposes, however, I continue to use the terminology of
associational or organizational standing for clarity and consistency in light of the existing case law.
7
See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 334 (1977) (laying out the
indicia of membership, including electing the members of, financing, and serving on the commission at
issue).
8
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

64

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:59

must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative” that a favorable
decision will redress the harm.9
Previously, a collection of doctrines referred to as “prudential
standing” also generally required that plaintiffs: (1) assert their own rights,
not those of third parties; (2) not seek redress for “generalized grievances”
shared equally by many; and (3) fall within the “zone of interests” that the
relevant statute was intended to benefit.10 In March, 2014, the Supreme
Court re-characterized some of these questions as not relating to standing
at all.11 In Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,12 the
Court concluded that the “zone of interests” is really a question of the
scope of the cause of action created by statute.13 The Court also observed
that it had already essentially reclassified the bar on generalized grievances
as constitutional, rather than prudential.14 Finally, the Court described
third-party standing as “harder to classify”; although noting that third-party
standing questions have occasionally been treated as “closely related to the
question whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of
action on the claim,” the Court declined to definitively resolve where thirdparty cases fall in the “standing firmament.”15
The Supreme Court and scholars have offered a number of
justifications for standing limitations—that they assure concrete,
adversarial litigation, guard against constitutionally impermissible advisory
opinions, and, more broadly, further an appropriate separation of powers.16
These standing restrictions, their justifications, and their relationship to
Article III have been criticized and debated as a textual, historical, and
practical matter.17 They remain, nonetheless, the keys to the courthouse
9
Id.; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–
81 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
10
Engel, supra note 2, at 369–70.
11
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
12
134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
13
Id. at 1387.
14
Id. at 1387 n.3.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., id. at 1386–87; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (discussing
separation of powers); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890–92, 895–
96 (1983) (arguing that standing serves separation of powers interests, but at best poorly furthers the
adversary nature of the proceedings, as interest groups may be the best advocates but often lack
standing); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
309, 339–40 (1995) (arguing that limiting standing to unintentional plaintiffs helps delineate the
lawmaking powers of the courts and Congress).
17
See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 461–65 (2008)
(noting that standing is tasked to serve multiple separation of powers functions, and serves them fairly
poorly); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275,
276–78 (2008) (challenging the history and doctrinal soundness of requiring injury-in-fact in private
rights cases); Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An
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III. QUASI-SOVEREIGN INTERESTS AND PARENS PATRIAE STANDING
A. The Doctrine
When a state sues in federal court, its interest in the suit is usually
classified as sovereign, quasi-sovereign, or proprietary.18 Sovereign
interests include the right to create and enforce a legal code.19 Proprietary
interests are those that a state shares with any other litigant—they derive
from its role as a landowner, say, or a party to a contract.20 The quasisovereign interest, which gives rise to parens patriae standing,21 is a
“judicial construct that [does] not lend [itself] to a simple or exact
definition”22 but which implicates the state’s interest in the well-being of
its residents and in maintaining its proper place in the federal system.23
Courts have found quasi-sovereign interests in: “[I]nterstate water rights,
pollution-free interstate waters, protection of the air from interstate
pollutants, and the general economy of the state.”24 The coherence of the
quasi-sovereign interest, and the merits and pedigree of the parens patriae
standing now based upon it, remain contested.25
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010) (offering
an empirical analysis of the historical evolution of standing doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992)
(challenging the injury-in-fact requirement as a doctrinal and historical matter); Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394–1409 (1988)
(offering a historical account of standing-related concerns and the case or controversy requirement);
Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689,
690 (2004) (undertaking a limited historical defense of standing doctrine).
18
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02 (1982)
(discussing the different interests a state may have). Governments may also litigate solely on behalf of
a private real party in interest, but such actions remain essentially private suits. Id. at 602.
19
Id. at 600–01.
20
Id. at 601–02.
21
See generally Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L.
REV. 2051, 2054–55 (2011) (exploring parens patriae standing and its relationship with quasisovereign interests).
22
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
23
Id. at 601–02, 607.
24
Jeffrey Baddeley, Parens Patriae Suits by a State Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 33 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 431, 446 (1983).
25
Cf. George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 896–98 (1976) (providing a review of early parens patriae cases rooted in
“the royal prerogative,” which dealt largely with children, charities, and individuals not deemed
competent to represent their own interests); Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1847, 1851 (2000) (“‘Quasi-sovereign’ is one of those loopy concepts that comes along often enough to
remind us that appellate courts sometimes lose their moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a
meaningless term absolutely bereft of utility.”); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in
Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273, 303–04 (2007) (claiming that
different interests in this category result in the courts implicitly applying different standing burdens);
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In the leading modern parens patriae case, Alfred L. Snapp & Son v.
Puerto Rico ex rel Barez,26 Puerto Rico sued Virginia apple growers,
alleging that they discriminated against hundreds of Puerto Rican citizens
and thereby undermined a national unemployment program.27 When suing
as parens patriae, the Supreme Court noted, a state cannot merely step into
the shoes of its residents, but must name a broader interest in the matter.28
In concluding that Puerto Rico had standing to press its claims, the Court
accepted as sufficient Puerto Rico’s “legitimate concern” for its residents’
unemployment rate, stigmatic harm, and ability to benefit from a federal
unemployment law.29 Snapp thus mandates that the wrongs a state seeks to
remedy in a parens patriae suit must directly or indirectly affect a
substantial portion of the state.30 Interestingly, in his concurrence, Justice
Brennan argued that states need broad parens patriae standing in the lower
courts to be able to protect their constituents’ interests, just as private
entities and municipalities can.31
After Snapp, courts and scholars debated whether states suing as
parens patriae also had to satisfy ordinary Article III standards.32 In
Massachusetts v. EPA,33 the Supreme Court joined the debate. There,
several states, municipalities,34 and private entities challenged the EPA’s
decision not to regulate certain greenhouse gasses emitted by new motor

Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 397–434 (1995) (offering
an alternative account of early cases, emphasizing their limitations on states’ ability to litigate
sovereign and public interests in federal court).
26
458 U.S. 592 (1982).
27
Id. at 608. The Court was willing to treat Puerto Rico as equivalent to a state. Id. at 608 n.15.
28
Id. at 607. Noting the awkward fact that states must vindicate their residents’ interests, but not
“merely adopt the interests of some subset of its citizens[,]” one critic has suggested resorting to the
economic principles of public goods as a “neat” guide to this tension. Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The
Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 833 (2009).
29
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609–10.
30
Id. at 607; see also Ratliff, supra note 25, at 1851 (discussing the necessary scope of the effect
of wrongdoings); Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA:
Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1070 (2008) (“In
addition, courts have held that the more widely shared an injury is, the more likely it is to implicate a
state’s quasi-sovereign interest.”).
31
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 611 & n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). In discussing municipal standing,
Justice Brennan cited Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–11 (1979),
discussed at greater length below.
32
See, e.g., Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335–36 (1st Cir. 2000)
(denying parens patriae standing to Mexico; describing the doctrine after Snapp as a “narrowly
construed” exception to normal standing rules and the question as one of prudential standing); Thomas
W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 304–06 (2005)
(proposing that states should not need Article III standing to bring a public nuisance suit in their own
courts, but should in federal court).
33
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
34
Baltimore and New York City were plaintiffs, but their standing was not passed upon. Id. 504
n.3 (2007).
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35

vehicles. Writing for the five justice majority, Justice Stevens found that
Massachusetts, at least, had standing.36 The Court reasoned that a state’s
quasi-sovereign interests entitle it to “special solicitude” in the standing
analysis, but failed to precisely identify the quasi-sovereign interest at
stake, or explain how that solicitude operates.37 Instead, the Court
described Massachusetts’ sovereign and proprietary interests, including its
interest in the land it would lose to rising seas.38 This shifting focus led
some to object that Massachusetts is hardly a parens patriae case at all.39
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that states must identify a
quasi-sovereign interest in addition to, not instead of, meeting the ordinary
Article III standing test.40 “Just as an association suing on behalf of its
members must show not only that it represents the members but that at
least one satisfies Article III requirements,” he noted, “so too a State
asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae must still show that its
citizens satisfy Article III.”41
The point remains contentious. In 2011, an equally divided Supreme
Court affirmed the standing decision of the Second Circuit in another
global warming case.42 The appellate court had declined to resolve whether
states suing as parens patriae have to satisfy both Snapp and Lujan,43 but
rejected the notion that a state must show that its residents have Article III
standing, reasoning that the idea improperly conflated parens patriae and
associational standing.44
35

Id. at 504–07.
Id. at 518. The Court was construing the Clean Air Act with its broad citizen-standing
provisions. Id.
37
Id. at 520–21. It also noted that, as in that case, claimed violations of procedural rights invoke
relaxed immediacy and redressabiblity hurdles. Id. at 515–17. Bradford Mank has suggested enshrining
these relaxed immediacy and redressability requirements in the parens patriae doctrine as a reflection
of states’ historically unique litigation status. Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing
Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1701, 1775–80 (2008). Calvin Massey, however, argues that even those relaxed
standards cannot account for the analysis in Massachusetts. Calvin Massey, State Standing After
Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 255–57 (2009).
38
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522–23. Some have questioned the functional utility of the
distinction between sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests. See Weinstock, supra note 28, at 828–29
(noting how the two concepts are often confused and arguing that they are not doctrinally distinct). But
cf. Crocker, Note, supra note 21, at 2070–79 (2011) (arguing that the standing bar from Massachusetts
v. Mellon applies to quasi-sovereign, but not sovereign, interests).
39
Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future
Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1065, 1085–88 (2011).
40
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 & n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts also
objected that states usually cannot sue the federal government as parens patriae. Id. at 539.
41
Id. at 538.
42
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
43
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 338 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d in part 131
S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
44
Id. at 339.
36
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The precise relationship between parens patriae standing and other
standing doctrines thus remains unclear.45 We may content ourselves for
now, however, with noting that states face an easier standing standard than
other plaintiffs.46 Therefore, although there are exceptions,47 a state can sue
most private parties48 so long as it can “(1) demonstrate that [it has] a
quasi-sovereign interest; (2) meet the numerosity test; (3) allege a distinct
injury [from that of its constituents, i.e., not be a nominal party]; and (4)”
demonstrate that it has a cause of action under the relevant statute, as
appropriate.49
B. (In-)Applicability to Local Governments
Even the briefest nationwide survey of municipal services seems to
confirm then-Professor (now Judge) David Barron’s intuition that cities,
“like higher-level governments,” “plainly have a ‘quasi-sovereign’ interest
in protecting the well-being of their residents.”50 After all, in many cases, a
city plays a similar role to a state in the lives of its constituents,51 even
while struggling to cope with a sticky mix of state and federal
programming, unfunded mandates, and the unmet needs of constituents.52
45
See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Colloquy, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New
Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1035–36 (2008) (concluding
that the best reading of Massachusetts requires states to satisfy some form of the Lujan test, and
criticizing the Court’s discussion of when states can sue the federal government in parens patriae).
46
See Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty
and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 146 (2010) (explaining how the
standing requirements are relaxed for sovereign entitites); Wildermuth, supra note 25, at 320 (arguing
that quasi-sovereign interests “are subject to a Lujan-lite analysis for which we use either a state's
proprietary interest or a resident's interest”).
47
See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972).
48
There are limits on when a state can sue the federal government as parens patriae. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007) (discussing the difference between allowing a
state to protect its citizens from federal statutes and allowing a state to assert its rights under federal
law); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488–89 (1923) (concluding that the plaintiffs could not
bring suit against the federal government).
49
Engel, supra note 2, at 368; see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88, n.3 (2014) (explaining that the zone-of-interest test is a measure of the cause
of action, not a question of prudential standing).
50
David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 115 YALE
L.J. 2218, 2243 (2006); see also Engel, supra note 2, at 371 (“These [economic well-being] injuries all
invoke cities’ quasi-sovereign interests. In addition, as parens patriae, cities have an interest in
protecting their residents from fraud and discrimination.”).
51
See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 256 (2004)
(noting that while states formally control the provision of “most domestic public services,” localities
“play the key role in actually delivering such basic services as policing, fire prevention, education,
street and road maintenance, mass transit, and sanitation”).
52
See David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field From the
Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 275 (2005) (noting that local officials in Massachusetts reported having “no
meaningful fiscal discretion” due to the constrained ability to raise funds and substantial unfunded
demands from state programs and policies); Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the
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Moreover, cities seem to agree with Barron. Given the chance to litigate
(mostly in state court, under the guise of public nuisance or a statutory
cause of action), Los Angeles sued its street gangs,53 and many cities
sought—with varying degrees of success—to sue the gun industry in an
effort to stem the black market in firearms.54
Even so, federal courts have been fairly consistent in holding that cities
cannot sue as parens patriae.55 This must be so, most insist, because city
power is only derivative of state power, and therefore lacks that residual

Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS L. REV. 371,
373 (2008) (“[L]ocal governments can be viewed as perhaps the most critical level of government in
terms of responding—through regulation, goods, or services—to the needs and wants of its
constituents.”); Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of
Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2558 (2006) (“[C]entral governments are
quick to intervene to counter local decisions they disagree with but slow to intervene to take on the
responsibility for providing basic municipal services. Cities thus may have significant responsibilities
but insufficient resources to meet them.”).
53
People v. Pantoja et al., No. BC403319 (L.A. Sup. Cty. Ct. Dec. 8, 2008), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/18thstreet.pdf; see also Richard Winton, Gang
Leaders’ Assets Sought in Civil Suit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at B3 (describing L.A.’s suit against its
gangs as a “first-of-a-kind lawsuit”).
54
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the city’s public nuisance, negligence, and negligent entrustment claims against gun
manufacturers); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2005),
(denying a motion to dismiss), rev’d in part without addressing standing, 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir.
2008); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1116, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (declining to
find a public nuisance cause of action, and noting that recovery was barred by, inter alia, the municipal
cost recovery rule); see generally Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The
Standing of Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 12–20 (2010) (describing firearms litigation); Jonathan L. Entin,
City Governments and Predatory Lending Revisited, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 108, 111–
12 (2014) (recounting the less-than-fully-successful resolution to those cases). Cities have also filed
suit in state or federal court on issues including air pollution, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution,
481 F.2d 122, 124 (9th Cir. 1973), and lead paint abatement, City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
823 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
55
See, e.g., City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As a
municipality, Sausalito may not simply assert the particularized injuries to the ‘concrete interests’ of its
citizens on their behalf.”); United States v. City of Pittsburg, 661 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“Although cities may ‘sue to vindicate such of their own proprietary interests as might be congruent
with the interests of their inhabitants,’ only the states and the federal government may sue as parens
patriae.”); City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“A city generally
does not have parens patriae standing.”); see also Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City
Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 764 (2007) (finding parens patriae
standing for cities unlikely); Engel, supra note 2, at 368 (explaining that federal courts will not grant
cities “quasi-sovereign standing” even if state standing rules would). But cf. City of New York v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 266–74 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), (discussing the law governing
relative authority of governmental entities and finding legitimate parens patriae power), rev’d in part
on other grounds at 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2008); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp.,
126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 892–93 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[The city] has admitted that one of the bases for its
negligence suit is its parens patriae power.”), dismissal aff’d, 277 F.3d 415, 420 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that the City's Article III standing was not questioned).
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sovereignty that affords states special treatment in federal court.56 This
reasoning is quite consistently applied, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has arguably allowed a village to assert its residents’ interests, at
least alongside the village’s own.57 The best that a city can often hope for
in federal court is that the judge will view the city’s proprietary interests
expansively,58 or accept an innovative use of public nuisance law.59
This state of affairs seems intensely misguided. Many courts simply
insist that a city is “derivative” of its state and a mere “creature of state
law,” unauthorized to speak for its residents—all without even asking
whether that very state law gives the city an interest in its residents’
wellbeing.60 The idea that a state could delegate its sovereign interest, or

56
Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[P]olitical
subdivisions . . . cannot sue as parens patriae because their power is derivative and not sovereign.
Municipalities may, however, ‘sue to vindicate such of their own proprietary interests as might be
congruent with the interests of their inhabitants.’”) (citations omitted); accord In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.1973) (“[T]he federal government and the states, as
the twin sovereigns in our constitutional scheme, may in appropriate circumstances sue as parens
patriae” but that “[o]n the other hand, political subdivisions such as cities and counties, whose power is
derivative and not sovereign, cannot sue as parens patriae, although they might sue to vindicate such of
their own proprietary interests as might be congruent with the interests of their inhabitants.”); Bd. of
Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty. v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 566 (E.D. Va. 1976) (suggesting that
municipalities never have parens patriae standing, as a “derivative” of the state’s sovereignty). But see
Engel, supra note 2, at 355–56 (“[B]road grants of standing to cities to pursue claims against predatory
lenders are necessary . . .”).
57
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Court allowed the Village to sue realtors who
allegedly engaged in racial steering in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 441 U.S. 91 at 109–10 (1979).
The Court reasoned that steering hurt the village financially, and suggested that it could challenge the
“community” harms that flow from the loss of racial balance and stability. Id. at 110–11. The Court
was not clear whether Bellwood could sue for the “community” absent a claimed proprietary harm.
Notably, however, Justice Brennan cited Bellwood in his Snapp concurrence, arguing that Puerto Rico
should have at least as much standing as cities. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 612 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). But cf. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria
Canal Co., 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 91, 99 (1838) (reasoning that a corporation did not have standing to
vindicate the rights of the citizens of Georgetown).
58
See, e.g., City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1197–98 (noting that a municipality’s “proprietary
interests” include its ability to enforce land-use and health regulations, flex its taxation power, and
protect its natural resources).
59
See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun
Sellers: New Insights and Challenges, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 42–43 (2004); Engel, supra note 2,
at 385 (noting that it is unclear whether cities’ public nuisance claims are proprietary (for expenses
incurred in remedying nuisances), or quasi-sovereign (for parens patriae obligations regarding the
health and safety of residents)). But cf. Camden Cnty. Bd. v. Berretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536,
539–41 (3d Cir. 2001) (expressing skepticism that New Jersey nuisance law encompassed Camden
County’s claim against the gun industry).
60
Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 15–25 (2012). But cf. Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 F. App’x 795, 802 (10th Cir. 2011)
(affirming the district court’s reliance on state law to assess county district attorney’s standing claim,
and holding that statutory authority to sue to abate environmental nuisances was not a delegation of a
state’s sovereign authority to bring a Clean Water Act parens patriae suit); Town of East Troy v. Soo
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that state law could create a particularized interest that in turn could confer
federal standing, is hardly frivolous.61 There is thus nothing inevitable
about courts denying cities parens patriae standing in every case. Even so,
the uncertainty alone discourages municipal public interest suits, reducing
cities’ incentives to invest in developing cases that could fail right out of
the gate. And the sheer number of times that cities have been rebuffed
suggests that a new approach may be in order.
IV. THE LAW OF ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING
In Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts essentially suggested a
solution to this problem, pointing to the similarity between associational
standing and his (more stringent) conception of parens patriae standing.62
Practically speaking, cities may already be relying on associational
standing when they partner with nonprofits to share litigation resources and
assure that one party has standing.63 If cities can practically achieve a voice
in court by pairing with nonprofits, is it not preferable that they be able to
litigate unassisted, speaking solely and fully for their constituents? I submit
that they can, by directly invoking associational standing.64
A. The Doctrine
Since at least NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,65 the Supreme
Court has permitted some associations to assert their members’ rights,
recognizing that an association is the medium through which members
Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1127–32 (7th Cir. 1980) (invoking Erie and examining Wisconsin law
to conclude that a town had standing to bring a public nuisance claim for a chemical spill).
61
Compare Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–67 (2013), with id. at 2678–74
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (debating this point). See also Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We
Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551,
571–72 (2012).
62
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
63
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (explaining how several cities, including Boulder, Colorado, joined
nonprofits to sue two federal agencies over climate change).
64
Associational standing is not the only doctrine that allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of
others. Jus tertii standing has allowed litigants to assert the constitutional rights of third parties with
whom they share a “‘close relationship” so long as “the litigant is also injured, and the third party is
hindered from bringing the suit on her own behalf.” Tacy F. Flint, A New Brand of Representational
Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2003) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991));
see also Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and
Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 432–33 (1981) (distinguishing jus tertii
from associational standing, despite their ‘superficial’ similarities). Evaluating jus tertii standing as
applied to cities, however, lies beyond this Article’s scope. Moreover, jus tertii standing, at least as
much as associational standing, may be subject to revision in light of the Supreme Court’s recent push
to clarify the line between standing and merits, as evidenced by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 & n.3 (2014).
65
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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66

express their views. The Court understood that certain rights cannot be
vindicated except through a representative, and that an association can also
suffer directly if its constituents’ claims go unheard.67
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,68 the
Court explained that an association can sue on its members’ behalf when:
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.69
The plaintiff in Hunt was a government-created commission with only
state-mandated “members.”70 The Court found standing, however, because
the Commission acted like a private trade association: it served a
specialized segment of the community, and its constituents “possess[ed] all
of the indicia of membership in an organization” because they alone
elected Commission members, were eligible to serve as commissioners,
and financed its activities through “levied assessments.”71 The Court
emphasized that the Commission’s constituents used it to express their
views and protect their interests. Furthermore, the Commission itself
would be affected by the litigation, ensuring that the suit would have “‘that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.’”72
B. Cities and Associational Standing
1. Background
Will it be said, that the fifty odd thousand citizens in
Delaware being associated under a State Government, stand
in a rank so superior to the forty odd thousand of
Philadelphia, associated under their charter, that although it
may become the latter to meet an individual on an equal
66
357 U.S. 449, 459–60 (1958); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (stating that
the association may be an appropriate representative of its members and invoke the court’s
jurisdiction); Nat’l Motor Freight Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 246 (1963) (“Since
individual member carriers of appellants will be aggrieved by the Commission’s order, and since
appellants are proper representatives of the interests of their members, appellants have standing to
challenge the validity of the Commission's order in the District Court.”).
67
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 459–60.
68
432 U.S. 333 (1977).
69
Id. at 343.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 344–45.
72
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 156, 204 (1962)).
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footing in a Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure would
not comport with the dignity of the former? . . . Such
objections would not correspond with . . . that popular
sovereignty in which every citizen partakes.73
In 1838, the city of Georgetown, through its officials, sued the
Alexandria Canal Company to enjoin construction in and around the
Potomac River that it claimed was harming both the port and its
residents.74 The Supreme Court agreed with the Canal Company that
Georgetown lacked the capacity to sue.75 The Court stressed that
Georgetown was a corporation, and neither its charter nor the general law
of corporations gave it the authority “to take care of, protect, and vindicate,
in a court of justice, the rights of the citizens of the town, in the enjoyment
of their property, or in removing or preventing any annoyance to it.”76
Therefore, Georgetown could not “upon any principle of law, be
recognised as [a party] competent in court to represent the interests” of its
citizens.77 Nor did “associating” the plaintiffs with Georgetown residents
fix the problem; in cases where a plaintiff could represent similarly
situated individuals, the plaintiff, nonetheless, had to have an interest in the
suit, and the Court found that Georgetown had not adequately alleged
one.78
Notably, although the Court rejected Georgetown’s suit, its reasoning
did not foreclose the possibility of standing for other cities, which might
have mandates to “care [for], protect, and vindicate” residents’ rights.79
Despite the heavy rhetoric, the Court essentially presaged the arrival of
associational standing80 and the idea that cities might fulfill that role.
73
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419, 472–73 (1793) (Jay, C.J.), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
74
Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 91, 92 (1838).
75
Id. at 99. I say “capacity” rather than “standing” as the case predates modern standing doctrine.
The Court treated the problem as one of pleading, not jurisdiction, later citing Georgetown as a case in
which relief was denied, but the “jurisdiction of the court was sustained.” In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,
587 (1895).
76
Georgetown, 37 U.S. at 99.
77
Id. at 100.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 99; see also, e.g., Parish of Jefferson v. La. Dep’t. of Corr., 254 So. 2d 582, 593 (La.
1971) (Barham, J., dissenting) (citing Georgetown for the proposition that “[i]n the absence of [a]
statutory provision or contractual right, a political subdivision is without power to maintain an action as
the representative of the individual and private interests of its citizens”); City and Cnty. of Honolulu v.
Cavness, 364 P.2d 646, 653 (Haw. 1961) (distinguishing Georgetown in part on the basis of the
authority that Honolulu actually had). These cases are troubling in their own way; a federal common
law of city incapacity is bad enough, but it is worse if it infects state courts. Cf. Morris, The Case for
Local Constitutional Enforcement, supra note 60, at 18–20, 25–26 (objecting to a federal common law
definition of city capacity).
80
Interestingly, some lower courts have applied Georgetown to cases involving more traditional
associations. See Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1935).
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More than a century later, Hunt confirmed that a creature of state law
may invoke associational standing, even if its members are not strictly
voluntary, if:
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 81
Since then, other public bodies have successfully claimed such
standing, although many were special rather than general-purpose
government entities.82 Even general-purpose municipalities, however, fit
the framework fairly well. Like the Commission in Hunt, cities represent a
specialized group—though geographically rather than (necessarily)
ideologically or economically specialized. Cities can also readily
demonstrate that their interests align with those of their residents, as harms
to residents likely impact cities in any number of concrete, provable ways.
However, the general-purpose nature of city governments and their
residence-determined “members” do present a number of distinctive issues,
explored at greater length below.
The case law explicitly considering whether cities can invoke
associational standing is thinner than that dealing with cities suing as
parens patriae, and the results are mixed.83 The Seventh Circuit found no

81

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 3434–45 (1977).
See, e.g., Ore. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting a
protection and advocacy organization associational standing, despite federal funding and lack of
traditional members); Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 850 F. Supp. 1388, 1414
(E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that water districts could exercise “association standing”); Meek v. Martinez,
724 F. Supp. 888, 901–02 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (noting that an advocacy organization evidently received
both associational and proprietary standing); see also Kelsey McCowan Heilman, Comment, The
Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 237, 252 (2008) (arguing in favor of standing for protection and advocacy agencies serving
individuals with disabilities).
Judges tend to treat single-purpose governmental entities through “domain-centered” lenses,
which likely facilitates a finding of associational standing. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23–24 (2010). General purpose governments, like city and
county governments, often lack such a narrow lens and so present special challenges in the context of
associational standing. Of course, this distinction is far from tidy in some cases, but plumbing its
depths is beyond the scope of this Article.
83
Compare, e.g., City of Stamps v. ALCOA, Inc., No. 05-1049, 2006 WL 2254406, at *6 (W.D.
Ark. Aug. 7, 2006) (applying Hunt to the City’s claim under the Resource Conservation and
Reclamation Act and allowing the claim to proceed), with Bd. of Supervisors of Warren Cnty. v. Va.
Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 731 F. Supp. 735, 741–42 (W.D. Va. 1990) (denying parens patriae and
associational standing in a suit challenging the distribution of federal money under section 1983, as the
plaintiff “political subdivisions and related agencies” were mere creatures of the state, with no special
obligations to advocate for citizens in the claims at issue).
82
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84

reason the doctrine could not apply to cities. The D.C. Circuit strongly
suggested the opposite, and effectively accused the city of trying to usurp
parens patriae powers while discarding their limitations.85 Although
general purpose municipal governments undoubtedly pose some interesting
conceptual challenges for associational standing which I explore in greater
detail below, I suggest that the Seventh Circuit has the better of the
argument.
2. One “Member” Has Standing.
a. Member Injury
To invoke associational standing, an organization must show that at
least one member has standing to sue.86 Conceptually, this requirement
limits a city’s possible claims by disallowing suits for purely collective
harms.87 However, even if no member fully “embodies the interest at
stake,”88 a city litigator can readily present the individual stories of
multiple residents to show both the breadth of the harm and the
concreteness of the injury. Although some critics suggest that associations
should not have to identify affected members,89 it is both doctrinally safer
and narratively more compelling to do so. Indeed, Baltimore adopted this
approach, in part, when it sued Wells Fargo for allegedly targeting
African-American neighborhoods for subprime mortgages—highlighting
84

City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 697–99 (7th Cir. 1976).
City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The City’s analogy of
its representation of its citizens to a private organization’s representation of its members misconceives
the very concept of associational standing. . . . The City does not have ‘members’ who have voluntarily
associated, nor are the interests it seeks to assert here germane to its purpose. Rather the City is
effectively attempting to assert the alleged interests of its citizens under the doctrine of parens
patriae.”). In that case, however, the city did have standing to sue for its own injuries. Id. at 267; see
also Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 F. App’x 795, 801 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting associational
standing for a district attorney because, even if his office or district is a membership association, state
law did not entrust him with protecting health and welfare by suing under the Clean Water Act, and so
the suit was not germane to his office’s purpose).
86
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. The fact that an association as large as some cities need only find one
affected resident to establish standing is at most a mild check on a local executive’s ability to litigate
her conception of the public interest. Even so, this requirement is arguably more stringent than that of
parens patriae standing, at least as conceived by the Massachusetts majority. Professor Thomas Merrill
has suggested that the same requirement should apply to states suing in parens patriae in any court
other than their own. Merrill, supra note 32, at 305.
87
See Heidi Li Feldman, Note, Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collective Interest,
87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734–35 (1988) (arguing that current standing doctrine cannot accommodate
truly collective harms like environmental interests). Standing’s intense focus on individual injury could
also undermine important values of self-governance and representation or community advocacy. See,
e.g., Winter, supra note 17, at 1507–08, 1515.
88
Feldman, supra note 87, at 734.
89
See Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 17, at 511 (discussing how the Eleventh
Circuit did not require affected members to be identified when the alleged harm is prospective).
85
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harms to the City in part through the stories of its residents. All of this
raises the question, however, of whether residents are city “members,” or
have the necessary “indicia of membership.”91
b. City Residents as “Members”
An association is essentially the “coming together of individuals for a
common cause or based on common values or goals.”92 In Hunt, apple
industry participants had no choice in becoming Commission “members.”93
Although the Supreme Court seemed relatively untroubled by that fact,
cities have a stronger claim to voluntary constituency. A city can argue that
its residents chose where to live, deciding to affiliate with, and to be
represented by, that city.94 Indeed, local government scholarship and even
some case law has long—though not without controversy—relied in part
on the idea that cities compete for capital and residents.95
90

Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (D. Md. 2010).
See City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the idea
that cities have voluntary members, and asserting that the city was simply “attempting to assert the
alleged interests of its citizens under the doctrine of parens patriae”); accord Prince George’s Cnty. v.
Levi, 79 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Md. 1977) (rejecting the idea that residents are city “members”).
92
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 998 (2011). See also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (defining “association” as, inter alia, the “act of a number of persons
in uniting together for some special purpose or business.”); cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
633 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Protection of the
association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an
expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that
voice.”).
93
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 334.
94
See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from
the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 97–98 (1989) (arguing that
more than a state or national government, residence in a locality presents a choice—to some extent, a
reflection of one’s own needs and wants—linking cities with voluntary groups). Compare also Robert
C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1523 (1982) (arguing that
the primary salient difference between cities and homeowners’ associations is the “imperfectly
voluntary” nature of some cities’ membership), with Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners
Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1589–91 (1982) (disputing Ellickson’s
voluntary/involuntary distinction).
95
Compare, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54 (1973) (“Changes in
the level of taxable wealth within any district may result from any number of events, some of which
local residents can and do influence. For instance, commercial and industrial enterprises may be
encouraged to locate within a district by various actions—public and private.”), with Barron & Frug,
supra note 52, at 265–66 (discussing the related debate over the nature and constraints on local power);
GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING CITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 177 (2001) (discussing
competition in city services and tax burdens); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors:
The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 165 (2005); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418, 420 (1956) (positing a “consumer voter” who moves to
a community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences). Of course, whether that
assumption is realistic, and whether it treats cities too much like private entities, is hotly disputed. See,
e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346,
408–09 (1990); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843,
91
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Many people emotionally affiliate with their city of residence (though
admittedly not necessarily in the same way that they belong to, say,
Greenpeace).96 While not everyone is likely to move to a city just because
it embraces their own stance on immigration or global warming, a few
cities may become so identified with certain issues that such membership
or identity interests can be significant.97 Some local government activity is
likely designed in part to elicit long-term loyalty precisely by responding
to and reflecting residents’ social, as well as economic, preferences.98 In
any event, people do often move to a given city with certain
expectations—such as a safe environment or a health care safety net—and
may expect cities to defend those expectations however necessary.99 Those
legitimate expectations reflect a different kind of identification between
city and resident, but one that need not be ignored by the courts.
Some courts faced with associational standing cases have adopted a
stringent definition of membership—officers and legal members count,
but, for example, those who use the organization’s services do not.100 Such
courts are unlikely to treat city residents as “members.” Whether or not
residents are truly “members,” though, the city-resident relationship readily
satisfies many of Hunt’s “indicia of membership.”101
City residents constitute a “discrete, [relatively] stable group of
900–02 (1999); Gerald E. Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 31, 34 (2000) (criticizing the
“privatized conception of city power”).
96
See Michael Sarbanes & Kathleen Skullney, Taking Communities Seriously: Should
Community Associations Have Standing in Maryland?, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283, 291
(1995) (arguing for abandoning a narrow associational standing rule under state law and defining
communities, as sometimes distinct from local governments, as relatively small groups with some
shared life and interests, an accepted identity, and people who identify as members of the group).
97
Cf. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 567, 605 (2008) (noting that cities with sanctuary laws are making expressive claims to
“immigrant-friendly” identities and constitute “critical integration measures”); Schragger, Can Strong
Mayors Empower Weak Cities?, supra note 52, at 2573 (“Charismatic leadership can generate
collective feelings of ownership and belonging and can articulate a city’s civic identity. Even the
symbolic acts of a strong mayor can alter the popular perception of the city. To the extent that city
residents begin to understand themselves as members of a unique polity, they are more likely to
demand recognition as an identifiable political constituency.”).
98
For potential downsides to such signaling, see Joseph Blocher & Ilan Graff, Colloquium,
Constitutionalizing Local Politics, HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. (2011) available at
http://harvardcrcl.org/cr-cl-presents-a-colloquium-the-case-for-local-constitutional-enforcement/
(noting that cities taking controversial litigation stances might drive out dissenters).
99
See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2001)
(“There is a value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discretion to make the decisions that their
residents wish them to make. The value inheres in the traditional advantages that attend
decentralization. These include more participatory and responsive government; more diversity of policy
experimentation; more flexibility in responding to changing circumstances; and more diffusion of
governmental power, which in turn checks tyranny.”).
100
See Hope, Inc. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797, 813–16 (7th Cir. 1984) (dismissing Hope
Inc.’s attempt to representthose who seek its services).
101
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344.
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persons with a definable set of common interests.” Often, city residents
alone elect, comprise, and at least partially finance their local government.
This gives city residents a better claim to “membership” than many
members of litigating associations, who may donate to an organization but
have no real further hand in its activities.103 Certainly, if a city attorney is
elected, her constituents have more sway over her than non-voting, nonprofit “members” likely do over corporate decision makers.104 And, for any
case in which a city litigator has decided to invest in litigation, we might
expect that the city could readily show that its own interests were also
implicated in the suit.105 There is therefore ample basis for a court to treat
city residents as members of a municipal “association.”
c. The Problem of Member Heterogeneity
If city residents are city members, however, different problems arise.
Residents may have different interests in, and attitudes toward, a particular
issue.106 Thus, a city could face internal conflicts of interest that more
philosophically homogenous interest groups may not, giving rise to a
number of standing-related issues. For example, such internal conflicts
could signal that the suit is not truly germane to the city’s “purpose,”107

102
Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying standing to a “watchdog
group” who purported to represent all media viewers, and whose supporters did not govern or fund its
activities, because it was not the “functional equivalent of a traditional membership organization”).
103
Cf. Health Research Grp. v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1979) (denying nonprofits
standing where they had no legal members; contributors and supporters had “absolutely no direct
control over” them, and there was an insufficient connection between the policy-generalist parent
organization (which received donations) and the subsidiary (whose focus was relevant to the suit, but
which received no direct donations)). See generally Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? Organization
Standing and Non-Voting Members of Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 47, 61 (2005) (noting inconsistencies in the structures of litigating environmental groups
and the treatment they have received in federal courts).
104
Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public
Law Offices, in THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN COLLOQUIUM AT YALE L. SCH.: WHY THE LOCAL
MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 51, 63–64 (2008) (discussing
the effects of wielding democratic power to pressure city attorneys); cf. Charles H. Steen & Michael B.
Hopkins, Corporate Governance Meets the Constitution: A Case Study of Nonprofit Membership
Corporations and Their Associational Standing Under Article III, 17 REV. LITIG. 209, 220–21 (1998)
(arguing that nonprofits should have member-controlled boards to obtain associational standing).
105
Cf. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345 (“[T]he interests of the Commission itself may be adversely affected
by the outcome of [the] litigation.”). The line between invoking one’s own rights and those of another
party is often blurry in the third party standing cases. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 243–47 (1988).
106
See Donald F. Simone, Note, Associational Standing and Due Process: The Need for an
Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U. L. REV. 174, 195–96 (1981) (arguing that courts should
consider member homogeneity as part of a due process analysis of the adequacy of representational
suits).
107
See Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, Associational Standing for Organizations with Internal
Conflicts of Interest, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 353 (2002) (“[U]nder the germaneness prong, a court
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lead individual residents to intervene to protect their interests, or
discourage the city from pursuing the case with the vigor that the Supreme
Court so values in associational standing.108 In this regard, cities might
almost be seen as prey to their own visibility. For example, city suits may
make a greater local “media splash” than suits of nonprofits, and therefore
be more likely to come to the attention of residents, prompting more
internal dissenters to speak out.109
Nonetheless, the problem of dissenters need not be fatal.110 The more
heterogeneous population may make more dissenters feel free to speak out;
they may also be more able to organize and effectively make themselves
heard than dissenters in some private associations. Thus, it is possible that
city dissenters are actually better off than dissenting members of traditional
associations. Furthermore, the very salience, localness, and democratic
accountability that make internal dissent less worrisome also makes deeply
divisive cases less likely; politically savvy attorneys will tend to choose
cases that are important to, and popular with, most constituents.
Even if a city does bring a controversial suit, it is not consistent with
either established parens patriae or associational standing doctrine to
require perfect consensus. In parens patriae suits, a problem need only
impact a “substantial portion” of a state’s population, and an attorney
general need not have anyone in particular’s blessing to sue.111 Similarly,
in associational standing, there are safeguards in place for dissenters. One
critic has suggested a framework for evaluating organizational conflicts of
interest:
The solution would require, as a first step, heightened
scrutiny of organizations with certain types of “profound”
should reject standing whenever a profound conflict negates the adversity required by the Case or
Controversy Clause of Article III of the Constitution.”).
108
Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 512–18 (2012) (arguing that attorneys general suing in
parens patriae often insufficiently represent the interests of affected individuals in part due to their
electoral accountability to people outside the affected group). For a thoughtful critique of Lemos’s
position, see generally Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights. Minn.
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
14-36
(forthcoming
2015),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2503999 (October 1, 2014).
109
Cf. Simone, supra note 106, at 191–95 (arguing that a court should examine whether notice
was provided to represented association members in determining whether they received adequate
representation).
110
See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 87, at 739 (“[P]ossible diversity of members’ interests at an
atomistic level does not negate the possibility of an associational commitment to the protection of one
another’s interests.”).
111
Although this state of affairs has been criticized as perhaps underserving the individuals on
whose behalf the suit is theoretically brought—in part because attorneys general are accountable to
those outside, as well as inside, the parens patriae group—this issue seems better resolved by an
analysis of when such suits should preclude private litigation, rather than by barring them altogether.
Cf. Lemos, supra note 108, at 512–18; Cox, supra note 108, at 25–34.
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conflicts. Then, in an examination under the germaneness
prong, a court should reject standing whenever a profound
conflict negates the adversity required by the Case or
Controversy Clause of Article III of the Constitution.
However, a court should grant associational standing if the
organization can show that the litigation was adequately
authorized by its members because such a showing suffices
to demonstrate sufficient adversity.112
Thus, a city’s democratic character weighs strongly in favor of
associational standing. Especially where the city council or an
independently-elected city attorney authorizes a suit, the presence of some
internal dissent should not normally bar litigation.
3. Individual Participation is Unnecessary
For obvious reasons, member heterogeneity also poses a problem
under the rule that associational standing is not appropriate if individual
participation will be necessary. If a locally controversial case prods local
dissenters to intervene, it would seem to violate this third prong.113 As
discussed above, in such cases, courts would need to closely examine the
effect on dissenters and whether their involvement would undermine
judicial efficiency—a key strength of associational standing.114 However,
the rule is somewhat more porous than it initially appears. Some courts
will accept limited individual participation in associational standing
cases.115 The Supreme Court once classified the individual-participation
bar as a “prudential” rather than constitutional limit on associational
standing, suggesting that (however it may be classified in the future) this
principle may be subject to a somewhat more flexible application.116 In the
end, to maintain an action over the dissent of some of its residents, a city
should simply have to show that the suit is properly authorized, dissenters
112
Edmonds, supra note 107, at 353. “Profound” conflicts are those in which, for example, an
association sues a member or did not follow its own internal process to authorize a suit which will
concretely harm some members. Id. at 367.
113
Id. at 363–64.
114
Id. at 372–74.
115
Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims
for Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1498 (2005) (discussing, inter alia, the Third Circuit’s decision
in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society v. Green Spring Health Services, Inc., 280 F.3d 278 (3d Cir.
2002)).
116
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
554–55 (1996). Of course, whether it should be treated as an issue of standing at all is open to question
in light of Lexmark. If the Supreme Court is inclined, however, to treat questions of third-party standing
as issues of the existence vel non of a cause of action, it would seem that the question of dissenters is
subject to a nuanced analysis as a question of fact, and only severe conflicts should suffice to push a
city out of court.

2014]

ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING FOR CITIES

81

will not undo the efficiency gains that associational standing affords, and
that proceeding otherwise does not violate the important policy
considerations behind associational standing.117
This prong poses one more problem. In many cases, the primary effect
of the “individual participation” bar is not to wipe out the claim, but to bar
any individual assessment of damages.118 Moreover, under the “fireman’s
rule,” cities often cannot recover their own public-service related expenses;
these restrictions together create a major disincentive for cash-strapped
cities to bring associational cases.119 Nonetheless, some issues so
powerfully affect both residents and cities that cities may still choose to
litigate—aided in some cases, of course, by statutes that shift costs and
allow the recovery of attorney’s fees.
4. Germaneness to the Organization’s Purpose
Even if it can adequately address any internal dissent, how does a city
show that a suit is germane to its purpose? Hunt demands germaneness to
assure that the litigating party is truly a “natural adversary” to the
defendants.120 With an organization as complex and multifaceted as city
government, however, determining “purpose” can be challenging.121
Furthermore, unlike in Hunt, cities may not benefit by pointing to a nongovernmental analog; large, multi-purpose associations have similarly
struggled to satisfy this prong.122
Cities might meet this challenge in several ways. First, cities can
117

See Edmonds, supra note 107, at 356.
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514–16 (1975) (“[T]o obtain relief in damages, each
member . . . must be a party to the suit, and [the association] has no standing to claim damages on [an
individual’s] behalf.”); see also Simone, supra note 106, at 184–85 (criticizing applications of this
prong that focus only on the requested relief).
119
See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323–24 (9th
Cir. 1983) (applying Arizona law to deny recovery); see also Note, Recovering the Costs of Public
Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1525–26 (2000) (discussing how municipal plaintiffs have dealt with the City of Flagstaff framework in
suits against the gun industry). But cf. White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (rejecting the firearms industry’s contention that an “amplification” of Ohio fireman’s rule
should bar gun liability suits).
120
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751, 517 U.S. at 555–56.
121
This prong critically distinguishes cities from states on the one hand and private actors or
limited-purpose governments on the other: Cities are not considered sovereign, but they also lack the
single focus that most special-purpose governments and nonprofits have. See Gerken, supra note 82, at
26–28 (noting that localist scholarship, especially that extending federalism to cities, essentially stops
at cities because they are the only sub-state entities that look or act like states). This may account for
the success that some limited purpose entities have had in obtaining associational standing.
122
See, e.g., Health Research Grp. v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21, 27–28 (D.D.C. 1979) (denying
nonprofits standing where, among other issues, there was insufficient connection between the parent
organization (that received donations, but whose “purposes” were broad and general) and the
subsidiary (whose purpose the suit related to, but which did not receive contributions)).
118
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identify, in detail, the powers and responsibilities delegated to them by
state law, including home rule powers. Courts will often find that cities
must protect the “health and welfare” of their residents,123 but also have a
host of more detailed, specific powers and obligations. Even a broad
“health and welfare” delegation should suffice to support standing in at
least some cases. After all city residents’ welfare may be harmed in a way
that is specific to, or amplified by, the place in which they live—precisely
the sort of local harm that states often give cities the power to address. Not
all courts, however, have taken a broad view of a government entity’s
delegated authority.124
In any event, city litigators may confront a court in search of a limiting
principle, or one inclined to define a municipal entity’s purpose narrowly.
In such cases, the city could show that it has suffered some loss or
expended resources in response to the problem—not to show independent
standing, but to demonstrate how the alleged harm is germane to the city’s
ordinary functions. If a noxious incident increases the amount that the
county hospital spends as a health center of last resort, for example, it
shows that part of what that county is for is caring for the indigent sick.
Cities often operate in the interstices—creating rules and programs in the
gaps left between state and federal actions.125 Showing that the city has
committed its limited resources to aiding its residents a particular matter
may help assure the courts that standing is proper, even in the absence of
formal statutory or constitutional delegation of a narrowly pertinent power.
Similarly, showing that the suit was properly authorized by the city
council or a duly-elected city attorney would help to demonstrate the nexus
between the suit and the city’s purpose. This inquiry and proof overlaps
substantially with that for showing a lack of profound conflict—for, as one
critic has noted, if a group has a profound conflict over a particular
litigation, it seems unlikely that the litigation is close to the central purpose
123
See City of Stamps v. ALCOA, Inc., No. CIV. 05-1049, 2006 WL 2254406, at *4–8 (W.D.
Ark. Aug. 7, 2006) (finding that a city satisfied the organizational standing requirements and that a suit
for site cleanup was germane to the city’s purpose, “which is, at least in part, to provide for the welfare
of its citizens under its police powers”); see also ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (“[A] home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare . . . .”). Although the Illinois Constitution refers to regulating rather than litigating in the public
interest, the provision still illuminates the “purpose” of a city.
124
See Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 F. App’x 795, 801–02 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
associational standing for a district attorney because, even if his office or district is a membership
association, state law did not entrust him with protecting health and welfare by suing under the Clean
Water Act, and so the suit was not germane to his office).
125
But cf. S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political
in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1431, 1483–84 (2012) (arguing that, in the
immigration context, “issue entrepreneurs” have stalled federal reform, in effect, to foster a space for
restrictive immigration policies at the state, and particularly local, levels).
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126

of the organization.
Overall, showing that litigation is germane to a city’s purpose is
challenging not because cities are likely to bring suits that are irrelevant to
their residents, but because cities may have so many purposes; courts may
be reluctant to give cities what looks like an unlimited pass into federal
court. However, insofar as the germaneness prong really reflects, as the
cases have suggested, concerns about alignment of interest and how
vigorously an organization will pursue a case,127 cities have more than
sufficient tools at their disposal to prevail.
V. SHOULD CITIES GET STANDING?
At this juncture, it is worth pausing to consider the objection that cities
should not be able to use associational standing to compensate for their
lack of parens patriae standing, or to avoid the limits on parens patriae
standing.128 It is in some sense obviously true that cities use associational
standing as a work-around for the unavailability of parens patriae
standing. In reality, though, it is no more of a work-around for a city than it
is for any other association that would otherwise lack standing to sue on
behalf of its members. It merely seems more like a “cheat” because we
perceive cities to be more state-like than, say, Defenders of Wildlife.129
The cases accusing cities of subterfuge, therefore, impose a special burden
on them—rendering municipal corporations worse off than private
associations specifically because state governments have empowered cities
with additional rights and responsibilities for their residents.130
I readily concede that municipal corporations are hard to categorize.
Every day, they interact with their residents in myriad ways—as service
providers, informational resources, formal and informal advocates,
126

Edmonds, supra note 107, at 358–60.
But cf. Stearns, supra note 16, at 423–32 (discussing associational standing cases, and arguing
that the general prohibition on third-party standing helps keep interested parties from manipulating the
path-dependent nature of adjudication, rendering “dubious” “bad poetry” the idea that courts are just
seeking sufficiently zealous advocacy).
128
See Prince George’s Cnty., Md. v. Levi, 79 F.R.D. 1, 5 (1977) (“[A city cannot] simply restate
the concept of standing as parens patriae in a way that avoided its limitations . . . .”).
129
While it might be argued that membership in an association implicates the First Amendment in
a way that residence in a particular city typically does not, many state constitutions contain fairly robust
protections for self-government and the self-determination that comes with it. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. XI (laying out the division of counties and local governments).
130
There has long been debate over whether and how cities are disadvantaged relative to private
corporations and associations. Compare Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1057 (1980), with Ellickson, supra note 94. I do not fully wade into that debate here, but offer the
more limited suggestion that this particular disconnect is unjustified. Although Professor Ellickson
makes the fair point that some seemingly unjustified disadvantages may fairly compensate for other
advantages given tocities, Ellickson, supra note 94, at 1577, it is difficult to see how the sorts of
advantages that he identifies (e.g., special tax status) are sufficiently related to the issues identified here
to be fairly characterized as offsetting.
127
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regulators and behavior “nudgers” (as with recent calorie disclosure laws),
market participants, and even outright adversaries (as in the ever-present
property tax litigation). Moreover, these roles are interdependent—being a
tax collector may be precisely what enables the city to provide benefits to
others. Given that cities do so much, it is sometimes daunting to assess
which hat a city is wearing in a particular dispute, and tempting to penalize
it for resembling other multipurpose governments. But cities’ shapeshifting nature, and the variations in municipal entities across the country,
are all the more reason to avoid making sweeping statements—and
deciding cases—on generic instincts about what cities are and do. In a
given case, the question should not be what cities do but what is this city
doing? Whose interests is it representing, and from where does it derive the
authority or obligation to do so? It is that locus of authority, and not some
creeping common-law of aggregated intuition, that should define (and in
appropriate cases, limit) a city’s ability to speak for its residents in federal
court.131
Plaintiffs bear the burden of explaining why they belong in federal
court. It will therefore fall to the city to credibly show that in a given case,
despite its institutional complexity, it is acting essentially the way a more
typical association would and that it otherwise satisfies the associational
standing test. If it can do so, it should (at least as a doctrinal matter) be
allowed to litigate unimpeded and should not be held to a higher standard
simply because it cannot invoke parens patriae standing.
Of course, even if cities can plausibly claim associational standing as a
doctrinal matter, one might fairly ask if we think it is a good idea—or
whether the task is better left to attorneys general, class action counsel,
specialized agencies, or litigating nonprofits. After all, the local
government scholarship is replete with reasons to be skeptical of increasing
local government autonomy or capacity: industry capture and economic
protectionism,132 cronyism, segregation and exclusion,133 majoritarian

131

See Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, supra note 60, at 15–25.
See, e.g., CLINT BOLICK, LEVIATHAN: THE GROWTH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE
EROSION OF LIBERTY 69–82 (2004) (arguing that local and state governments undermine residents’
economic freedoms to serve the interests of existing businesses).
133
In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court majority relied in part on the importance of local
control over schools to argue that a district court could not impose a metropolitan area-wide solution
for segregated schooling in the Detroit school district. 418 U.S. 717, 741–45 (1974). The dissents, in
contrast, argued inter alia that Michigan had a fairly centralized school system, with little local control,
making a broader geographic remedy appropriate. See id. at 768–72 (White, J., dissenting); see also
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 138–43 (1971) (upholding a California constitutional amendment that
prohibited the development of any low-rent housing project unless approved in a local election); cf.
Sarbanes & Skullney, supra note 96, at 296–97 (citing exclusion as an inherent risk of community
identity).
132
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disregard for personal and property rights, financial externalities, and the
list goes on. Even the Federalist 10 warns of local mischief, and that the
sometimes-intractability of higher-level governments can be protective,
and not merely a hurdle to overcome.135
Whether or not one wholly believes these accounts of the dangers of
localism, we should nonetheless strive to structure local government
authority to keep localism’s vices in check while maximizing the upsides
of a fine-grained, responsive, and accessible government.136 Often this goal
leaves us inclined to calibrate issue-by-issue how much to centralize
government power—but that is exceedingly difficult to do without
implicitly factoring in which level of government we think will adopt our
own normative position on a particular issue.137
The question of how much power we want to give localities is
particularly complex when we consider municipal standing in court,
because standing is something of a blunt instrument. Without modifying
standing by statute or (less commonly) narrowing it in a particular area
through case law, one cannot readily and coherently change the demands
of standing depending on how comfortable one is with local action on a
particular topic. Two points bear noting, however. First, associational
standing would not give cities standing to sue at all times over all things;
the need for a city to show that the suit is germane to its purpose injects a
modicum of issue-based calibration into the standing inquiry. Second, by
its very nature, standing gives us a different sort of assurance; cities cannot
simply impose their policy preferences on others, but must justify their
arguments to a neutral magistrate and have a sufficient basis in existing
law to withstand the rigors of litigation.
With these caveats in mind, there are several reasons to think that
allowing cities to reliably invoke associational standing would be a
positive development. First, from the perspective of their residents, cities
have distinct advantages in litigation over both nonprofits and nonmunicipal government actors. (Indeed, the changing role of cities in
contemporary America suggests that cities will be at least as well suited to
the task as states have ever been.) Second, cities are already engaging with
many of the same large, thorny issues through local legislation and policy;
barring them from using litigation where it would be a more efficient tool
serves little purpose. Third, strengthening cities’ standing may also have
134
See, e.g., BOLICK, supra note 132, at 83–94 (arguing that local governments abuse and
override individual property rights, often for only nominally public purposes).
135
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
136
See Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 51, at 263–72 (suggesting
re-structuring home rule to minimize the negative consequences of local authority and maximizing its
benefits).
137
See Frank Michelman, The Rhetoric and Substance of Self-Government, 4 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 510, 511–14 (1995).
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positive broader effects on cities and their constituents.
A. Cities’ Advantages in Litigation
1. Advantages Relative to States and Federal Agencies
Looking at federal and state court dockets, one might think that there is
no shortage of governmental suits to protect consumers. When a person’s
claimed harm relates to a controversial, politically sensitive, or heavily
lobbied issue, however, she may have a greater chance of mobilizing a city
to defend her interests than she would a central government.
It is hardly novel to note that there may be consensus on a contentious
issue at the local level (where the harm may be particularly concentrated)
despite a political stalemate at higher levels of government.138 A city’s
view of, and willingness to act on, a particular issue may diverge widely
from that of the state as a whole.139 If higher-level government action is not
forthcoming and an issue affects a substantial number of city residents, a
local government may feel that it has little choice but to address the
problem somehow.140 If a city is prepared to invest the resources and
political capital to speak on its residents’ behalf in the face of a stalemate
or opposition at a higher level of government, there seems little
justification to shutting the courthouse doors to the local perspective.141
Moreover, as the role cities play in their residents’ lives continues to
138
Cf. Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a
Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 212–14 (2010) (arguing, in response to
criticisms of concurrent state-federal enforcement, that the relevant political forces are different at the
state and federal level, and so concurrent enforcement might help guard against federal underenforcement and create a “productive [state-federal] tension” resulting in robust consumer protection).
139
See, e.g., Richard Schragger, The Progressive City, 44–46, in THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN
COLLOQUIUM AT YALE L. SCH.: WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC
INTEREST ADVOCACY (2008), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/Schragger.pdf (arguing that cities’
interests are often at odds with those of the suburban or rural majorities at the state level, and that cities
are frequently the origination point for progressive innovation, in part due to demographic differences);
cf. Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENVER U. L. REV.
1061, 1071–72 (2007) (arguing for a narrow view of preemption of local immigration legislation,
noting that “different states and local governments are affected in drastically different manners—
positively and negatively—by illegal immigration”).
140
Cf. Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 51, at 260 (“[R]ecent home
rule cases . . . provide[] striking evidence of the local willingness to experiment with new policies
concerning public health and safety, individual rights, social welfare, political reform, and the private
provision of public services.” (internal citations omitted)); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to
Hazleton! ‘Illegal’ Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal
Government Must Do About It, 39 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4–7 (2007) (noting that some state and local
immigration regulation arose as a result of the failure of the federal government to enact comprehensive
immigration reform).
141
Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 97, at 617 (“[T]he ‘one voice’ rationale for the federal exclusivity
principle sets too high a decision-making hurdle on the immigration issue, whose manifestations are
extraordinarily varied and whose practical consequences local communities must face every day.”).
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evolve, city standing in federal courts reflects a stylized and limited view
of what local governments are and do. The forces of globalization and
continued urbanization have changed understandings about which level of
government represents residents’ interests, and have undermined the
rationale for a strictly two-tier model of federalism.142 Just as many states
now have more people than the entire union did at the founding, many
modern cities have as many or more people than the largest states did
then.143 At the same time, the states’ role as our most salient community
has decreased.144 Therefore, although many modern cities are wildly more
diverse than the founding-era states, giving lower-level governments a
stronger voice may be key to preserving some of the democratic benefits
that the founders saw in the two-tier federalist model.145 Giving only state
and federal governments preferential standing treatment, therefore,
preserves a dual model that at best incompletely describes current
governance in the United States.146
Finally, many state and federal programs are actually administered
through local government. Indeed, many of the functions that courts and
scholars associate with states are quintessentially local.147 This boots-onthe-ground role gives cities a unique perspective and useful expertise on
how certain conduct impacts individuals and the community as a whole.148

142
See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 213–17 (1996) (proposing a
new paradigmatic approach to federalism).
143
See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of
Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 529–30 (2010) (“[M]ost states became
larger than what the entire union was a hundred years ago.”); Gordon, supra note 142, at 209 (“In 1790,
the largest population of any state was Virginia’s 692,000. Today, fourteen cities and sixty counties are
that large.”).
144
See Gordon, supra note 142, at 209–11 (“[T]he states no longer play the role in today’s polity
that they did at the time of the Founders.”).
145
Cf. id. at 218 (acknowledging that cities now play many of the roles that states played at the
time of the founding).
146
Blank, supra note 143, at 549–51.
147
See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1, 6–10 (1988); cf. also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (discussing the values of local control in the context of Texas’ system
of educational funding, noting that individual localities could tailor programming to “local needs” and
that pluralism promoted innovation and “healthy competition[:] An analogy to the Nation-State
relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of
the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments.’”) (footnote omitted)).
148
Cf. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477
U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (noting that a particular advantage of associational standing is that people join
organizations precisely to pool resources and vindicate their shared interests, and so associations have a
pool of specialized capital and expertise to bring to litigation); Blank, supra note 143, at 553 (“[Cities]
are physically closer to the controlled assets, provide services, govern citizens, and can thus collect
more easily and efficiently the relevant information and knowledge before making decisions regarding
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Increased standing for cities would help to bring the expertise of program
administrators to bear, and bring the law of standing in line with the
modern practice of governance.149
2. Advantages Relative to Private Actors
If cities are easier to prod into action on controversial issues than states
or the federal government, one might view private actors as still more
accessible. If one knows how to find them, it seems that there is a nonprofit
or class-action counsel interested in litigating every side of every major
issue. Holding aside the question of whether disadvantaged populations
have equal access to these resources and the stress placed on class
litigation by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, there are substantive
reasons to prefer cities to nonprofits or private counsel. In some cases,
private litigants may face additional hurdles or burdens of proof
inapplicable to government litigants—such as in pressing public nuisance
claims.150 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, New York City,
New York State, and the NAACP each sued members of the gun industry
who they claimed facilitated a black market for guns.151 The State’s case
was dismissed on the pleadings, and the City’s suit evidently stalled
temporarily in the wake of September 11, 2001.152 The NAACP proceeded
to trial (in which the City and State participated as
observers) and proved that the industry created a nuisance.153 Even so, the
judge dismissed the case because the NAACP, as a private plaintiff, had to
the assets, services, or citizens.”); Sarbanes & Skullney, supra note 96, at 312 (making a related point
about community associations). Many thanks to Erin Bernstein for pressing me on this point.
149
Cf. Blank, supra note 143, at 555 (arguing that cities need standing in international
organizations, including international courts and tribunals, to represent their interests).
150
Cf. Sarbanes & Skullney, supra note 96, at 306–07 (arguing for expanded standing for
community associations in state court by pointing out the practical difficulties of class litigation and the
inability to capture complicated community interests without creating unmanageable sub-classes and
complex litigation structures). It is not clear whether a city would be entitled to be treated as a public
rather than private entity for the purposes of public nuisance litigation if it proceeded solely on
associational standing—that is, solely as a representative of its residents. Cities’ ability to combine
multiple avenues of relief in one suit, on behalf of itself and residents, however, remains a substantive
advantage for cities.
151
See Megan O’Keefe, Note, NAACP v. AcuSport: A Call for Change to Public Nuisance Law,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 1079, 1106–07 (2005) (arguing that the City of New York had the best chance of
prevailing in the gun litigation, as a public entity not subject to the requirement of proving “special
injury” in the context of public nuisance litigation, and suggesting that the state was unlikely to
endeavor to revive its dismissed claim).
152
See City of New York v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262, 285 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
153
See NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The evidence
presented at trial demonstrated that defendants are responsible for the creation of a public
nuisance . . . .”). The 220-page opinion was so damning that the gun manufacturers appealed, despite
having won. Notice of Appeal, NAACP v. Acusport Inc., No. 99-CIV-07037 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2003).
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show that its members suffered harm different in kind, not just in degree,
from the public at large—a requirement, the court noted, that would not
apply to the government observers.154
As noted above, cities may have unique expertise and perhaps a
broader perspective than more narrowly focused private associations. The
wide variety of ways in which cities interact with their residents will often
give a municipality particular insight into the pervasiveness or impact of
wrongdoing. Cities may already have in-house experts who have studied
an issue, or even developed programs to cope with its effects.155 For
example, a county that provides the health care of last resort for its
residents is well positioned to speak to the effects of a health-related harm,
and a municipality that tracks land values as part of its taxation system has
valuable insight into the harms of predatory lending. In short, because of
the many ways in which these polities affect the lives of their residents,
they can act as valuable information aggregators regarding a wide variety
of harms suffered by their residents.156
3. Objections
None of this is to say that associational standing, or more standing for
cities in general, is a perfect solution. Indeed, there are very real reasons
for concern. On balance, though, I conclude that the current state of affairs
is unwarranted.
a. Adequate Representation
One might worry that because cities are political creatures, and may
directly suffer harm as well, they may privilege their own needs and
inadequately represent their constituents.157 Viewed against the status quo,
which is dominated by states and private actors, this objection takes on a
different cast. After all, a similar critique has been lodged against attorneys

154
NAACP, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 449, 455; cf. Eggen & Culhane, supra note 59, at 43–45 (“In sum,
Acusport reads like a municipal suit for public nuisance brought by the wrong entity.”).
155
Even Congress has from time to time acknowledged that certain local government entities are
“specially qualified and knowledgeable” on certain topics. Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation:
Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321,
343–44 (2012) (noting that Congress has, in some cases, predicated state action on consultation with
relevant local authorities and that these instances represent a Congressional judgment of local
competence and a recognition of state and local differences).
156
Of course, litigating associations that specialize in a particular issue or area may also have
relevant expertise. I do not suggest that cities should supplant all such litigating entities, but cities
certainly can serve as a useful complement.
157
Cf. Lemos, supra note 108, at 512–18 (arguing that Attorneys General suing in parens patriae,
because they represent both individual rights and the public interest, are often inadequate
representatives in litigation). For a rigorous and thoughtful response to these concerns in the context of
public compensation, see Prentiss Cox, supra note 108, at 34–38.
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general and leveled at litigating associations. In that light, the critique
hardly seems to justify specially limiting cities’ standing, when they are
often accountable to a smaller, narrower “public interest” than attorneys
general. Furthermore, relatively democratically accountable,160 resourceconstrained city attorneys seem unlikely to turn out many frivolous suits or
engage in half-hearted litigation. Their accountability mechanisms—and
their experience in allocating prized enforcement resources—should lessen
any concern that cities might disserve their constituents or abuse the broad
“prosecutorial discretion” that comes with representing the interests of a
sometimes vast number of “members.”161
On the other hand, one might ask why we should give a city the power
to override its residents’ decision not to litigate a particular injury.162 While
it seems fairly uncontroversial that individuals are unlikely to sue where,
for example, the harms are relatively small and diffuse, one might expect
residents to seek relief by class action in such cases.163 Of course, similar
objections can be leveled at parens patriae standing,164 but have not been
enough to limit that doctrine. Furthermore, one can fairly question the
frequency with which a resident’s inaction will be the product of a
deliberate choice to sit on her rights, as opposed to a lack of information
about what to do or even who harmed her. Even if a significant number of
city residents truly did wish to let the issue go, as noted above, they may be
able to voice their objections and, if there are enough objectors, defeat
associational standing altogether. Therefore, even though it is far from

158

Lemos, supra note 108, at 512–18.
See generally Simone, supra note 106, at 176–87 (“[D]ecisions made by an association’s
leadership do not necessarily reflect the views of its constituency.”).
160
Not all are directly elected, but most have some mechanism of accountability that is at least
equivalent to the minimal control that donors have over some associations. Cf. Morris, San Francisco
and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices, supra note 104, at 61–62 (noting
that cities are no less legitimate representatives than litigating nonprofits, and democratic accountability
provides an additional representational check on cities).
161
See, e.g., Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, supra
note 50, at 2234 (arguing that citizens can more easily challenge decisions made by cities than
decisions made by states); cf. Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article III Nondelegation Doctrine, 11
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 812, 827 (2009) (arguing that associations with many members effectively
exercise substantial prosecutorial discretion); Mank, supra note 37, at 1783–85 (2008) (arguing that
decisions of state attorneys general to sue will be constrained by negative political consequences and
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
162
Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1699–1707,
1724–25 (2007) (arguing that broad standing rules for constitutional violations can result in significant
inefficiencies because it allows one individual who wishes to assert a right or challenge a collective
harm to trump the rights of others who have chosen not to object, amounting to a class action with none
of its protections).
163
Id. at 1724–25.
164
See Wildermuth, supra note 25, at 306–07 (raising similar objections in relation to the exercise
of parens patriae standing by states).
159
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clear that a city’s action would necessarily bind its residents,
associational standing has a sort of opt-out mechanism that gives residents
more influence than they might have in a parens patriae suit.
b. Agenda Setting and Constraining Other Localities
Then-professor David Barron argued that if a city succeeds in
changing state or federal law on a particular point, it necessarily keeps
cities holding the opposite view from vindicating their policy preferences
even at the local level.166 By going to court, he argues, a city may reduce
local autonomy as a whole.167 Again, however, where nonprofits and other
private entities can litigate under precisely the same framework and obtain
much the same result, having an entity sensitive to local autonomy driving
the litigation would seem to be an improvement over the status quo. In
fact, if we allow a city to bring a suit on behalf of its residents (and
expressly not based on its own rights or interests), there may be less of a
risk to collateral local autonomy concerns, because the suit is not about
cities qua cities.
Still, suits let cities push the public agenda by doing more than leading
by example. Win or lose, affirmative lawsuits empower cities to set or
force agendas far more than municipal legislation typically does. When
cities take local legislative action, they may explain their decision by
reference to other laws and even constitutional norms. Doing so, however,
does not bind others to the same view of those norms.168 By the very act of
appealing to some external law in bringing litigation—be it the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection or even the common law—
cities press a very public debate on the legal status of the defendants’
conduct. Arguably, if we place that agenda setting power into the hands of
so many localities, certain politically or socially sensitive issues may be
pushed too hard, too soon, prompting backlash and ultimately harming not
165
See generally Prentiss Cox, supra note 108. Cf. Sarbanes & Skullney, supra note 96, at 312
(raising this question in the context of arguing for greater standing for community associations in state
court).
166
Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, supra note 50, at
2222; see also Blocher & Graff, supra note 98; Claire McCusker, Comment, The Federalism
Challenges of Impact Litigation by State and Local Government Actors, 118 YALE L.J. 1557, 1561–67
(2009) (discussing how local impact litigation creates tension in the federal system).
167
Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, supra note 50, at
2246–50.
168
Professor Morris has argued that local executive action such as lawsuits should not be viewed
as antithetical to local autonomy, but instead as local executive autonomy (as distinct from local
legislative autonomy). Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal
Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1903, 1924–25 (2014). Presumably, other local
executives could counter this just the way that, for example, competing state attorneys general do in
federal litigation by seeking to intervene or participate in litigation. Therefore, even if litigation could
reduce local autonomy by establishing a uniform rule of law, it would do so in ways that are consistent
with the current federalist dynamic.
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only the people the city hoped to help, but also similarly situated people
nationwide.169 This is no minor objection. Again, however, we should
consider the idea of city standing not as an idealized independent regime,
but in relation to the current state of affairs, in which the policy expert
associations may control an issue agenda to some degree, but private
plaintiffs already have precisely this sort of power. While cities have their
own base of support, and might be somewhat less responsive than some
other litigants are to the preferences of these specialist nonprofits, the city
will be accountable to its residents if it takes ill-advised action that
ultimately damages those interests. Therefore, extending representational
status to cities is unlikely to worsen things, and may even offer gains in
accountability.
B. Cities’ Current Engagement
Despite the common—though not uncontroverted170—refrain that
cities are mere “creatures of their states[,]” “no city is as thoroughly under
the thumb of the state as a matter of state law as the state creature
metaphor suggests.”171 Many have noted (with varying degrees of
enthusiasm) cities’ increased visibility and proactive legal engagement on
what we tend to think of as national and even international issues.172 Much
of the debate about local engagement has revolved around areas of
169
See generally Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution,
supra note 50.
170
The dissenting tradition maintains that local governance is an important right, and that some
city power originates from residents, not states. See, e.g., Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake
in Enforcing the Constitution, supra note 50, at 2239; Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local SelfGovernment, 13 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1900) (discussing the history of local government); Morris, The
Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, supra note 60; Jake Sullivan, Comment, The Tenth
Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J. 1935 (2003) (arguing that the people have a
Constitutional right to “choose and define their local government”).
171
Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, supra note 50, at
2220, 2243. Professor Barron has identified three ways in which state laws, despite their ostensible
control over local governments, create apparent local autonomy: first, by allowing municipalities to tax
property within their borders; second, through the exercise of local police powers, such as land use
regulation; and third, by way of the definitions of local governments themselves. See Barron, A Localist
Critique of the New Federalism, supra note 99, at 393–97 (noting that each of these can also be viewed
as constraining local autonomy in the sense of limiting options of neighboring cities that experience
externalities); see also Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities?, supra note 52, at 2556
(noting a city’s contradictory existence as “an administrative unit as well as a mini-sovereign”).
172
See Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices,
supra note 104, at 55 (“[T]he City Attorney’s Office has filed cases that ask such nationally resonant
questions as whether the state may exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage [and] whether a state
may terminate the Medicaid benefits of juveniles in detention centers . . . .”); cf. McKanders, supra
note 140, at 38 (arguing that local governments’ immigration-related regulations are constitutionally
preempted and bad policy); Robert A. Schapiro, In the Twilight of the Nation-State: Subnational
Constitutions in the New World Order, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 801, 815–16 (noting the increasing profile of
some cities on international issues).
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booming local legislation—issues like health care, climate change,
immigration,174 LGBTQ rights,175 and gun control.176 Although many local
efforts are legislative, not litigious, each reflects a “rising culture of
[municipal] engagement” with major issues that concretely affect their
residents,177 in an effort to protect them by whatever means are available.
Artificially limiting cities to legislative efforts may, in some cases,
accomplish little more than forced inefficiencies. For example, a city may
not have the resources to directly improve the situation of every
homeowner allegedly hurt by predatory lending, or address the influx of
black-market guns. Absent standing to hold the relevant private parties
responsible, the city that feels compelled to act may expend resources in a
futile effort to clean up a problem rather than stemming it at its source—
almost invariably to find its efforts challenged as ultra vires or preempted
by state law.178
One might object that we should limit cities to local legislation in order
to confine their attention to truly local problems and reduce externalities.
However, many issues are more local than they first appear.179 Where a
173
See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409, 410–11 (2008) (noting that municipalities often serve as the “front
line” in the regulation of emissions and other climate change related measures).
174
See Rodríguez, supra note 97, at 569 (noting that one of “the most notable regulatory trends”
of late has been “the rise of state and local efforts designed to control immigrant movement, define
immigrant access to government, and regulate the practices of those with him immigrants associate in
the private sphere . . . .”).
175
See Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 30 (2006)
(noting cases in which cities’ extension of health benefits to same-sex partners were upheld on home
rule grounds).
176
See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L. J. 82, 98, 108 (2013) (noting that the “vast
majority” of gun control regulations in America are local measures, and that the practice has deep
historical roots).
177
Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices,
supra note 104, at 51; see also Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 51, at
254–55 (discussing the role of municipalities in addressing everything from firearm regulation to
LGBTQ rights); Schragger, The Progressive City, supra note 139, at 39–44 (observing that this
engagement, especially on progressive issues, is more resurgent than new, as many of the progressive
reforms of the early twentieth century occurred at the state and local level).
Of course, I do not claim that cities should always litigate rather than legislate. I would note,
however, that the fact that many municipalities have chosen to address important issues through
legislation may not reflect a preference for that route, as standing, especially in federal court, is often
uncertain. That is to say, we should not justify the current state of affairs by reference to the product of
the current system.
178
See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1113–15 (2007)
(describing challenges to local laws).
179
Critics of dual federalism have long argued that there has been little success in creating bright
line rules about what is or should be truly national vs. “truly local.” See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro,
Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2133–35 (2006)
(noting that establishing this boundary is a “recurrent problem”); see also Gerald E. Frug, Empowering
Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553, 556 (1987) (noting that most major issues are “mixed
questions” in terms of what level of government should and must be involved in their resolution).
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particular issue is important and controversial enough to deadlock state or
federal governments, cities can be nimbler,180 and may bear uniquely local
burdens which push them to try innovative responses.181 Furthermore,
many state legislatures or constitutions have already endeavored to identify
issues appropriate for local control.182 Some cities can even adopt laws
contrary to general state law, if the laws implicate “local” or “municipal”
matters.183 When a city has validly adopted an ordinance on a particular
subject, a suit related to that ordinance is a suit to protect both local norms
and city powers.184 What is “local” should be assessed by the impact of
local action, not by whether it addresses an issue that will arise
elsewhere.185
Certainly, cities’ actions can impose real burdens on the communities
around them—both in terms of the specific policy adopted, and in terms of
the exercise of local autonomy more generally. Litigation may impose
externalities in the classic way that we think of them at the local level—it
might, for example, force a polluting company out of town and into an
adjoining community. It may also create policy externalities, however.
Although the literal terms of a judgment might only govern conduct within
city limits—say, prohibiting reverse redlining in Baltimore—judgments
have persuasive force in other courts. Moreover, national actors may set
their policies at a state, regional, or even national level. Therefore, a
judgment’s terms could be imposed on many other communities, including
180
See, e.g., Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level, supra note 52, at 375 (noting
that local governments have led the way, or tried to, on a number of controversial issues where larger
government structures have been unable to reach agreement).
181
See id. at 377–80 (discussing local immigration regulation and living wage laws); David D.
Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 25–26 (2010) (noting the damaging impact
of the foreclosure crisis on individuals and the additional costs to cities). But cf. Ramakrishnan &
Gulasekaram, supra note 125, at 1436–41 (2012) (challenging empirically the claim that federal
inaction and rapid demographic shifts account for local restrictive immigration policy activity).
182
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (describing home rule provisions for certain cities, and
identifying certain matters as particularly suited to local control).
183
See, e.g., Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, supra note 175, at 17–27
(noting a number of cases in which local laws have triumphed over conflicting state law when
pertaining to local political processes and interests); cf. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the
Local Level, supra note 52, at 373 (arguing for a broader reading of localities’ home-rule powers,
noting that home rule laws were intended as “mini Tenth Amendments” but have been restrictively
interpreted). But cf. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 130 (Conn. 2001) (noting that
home rule was designed to give cities control over their own affairs “to the fullest possible extent . . .
upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than did the state
at large” but finding that home rule did not override the general requirement of standing); Barron &
Frug, supra note 52, at 271–72 (discussing the broad state law preemption provision in Massachusetts’
home rule amendment).
184
Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)
(noting that a quasi-sovereign interest is often one that a state would address, if it could, through its
sovereign lawmaking powers).
185
See Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 51, at 264.
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those who had no objection to the underlying conduct. Unlike with
legislation, though, a litigation judgment presupposes that a neutral arbiter
has found a significant violation of the plaintiff’s rights. Furthermore,
unlike with local legislation, there is a formal mechanism for adjoining
communities to make themselves heard in litigation—intervention or
participation as amici. Accordingly, although courts can and should look
closely at the local interest in a particular suit, litigation may sometimes
offer a more efficient way to address a problem and allow all affected
parties to be heard.
C. City-Citizen relations
The relative power (or powerlessness) of cities remains much debated
in the local government scholarship,186 and that debate covers many
different definitions of local power or authority. It seems well understood,
however, that people are more likely to participate in and engage with their
local government if that government has the ability to influence matters
important to them.187 Therefore, reliably giving cities standing to bring
affirmative suits on behalf of their residents may increase residents’
incentive to interact with their local government. And if residents find
local government to be responsive and effective, it may even further their
commitment to stay put.
One can fairly worry that focusing local politics and action on local
officials’ vision of consumer protection or constitutional rights might lead
voters to choose their municipal leaders for their constitutional or social
visions over their bureaucratic competence, harming city functioning
overall.188 The vision of local government as primarily neutrally
bureaucratic rather than actively political, however, is normatively
loaded.189 Furthermore, if technocratic competence is critical to residents,
no matter how much they approve of a city’s affirmative litigation they
will not long tolerate officials who undertake such suits at substantial cost
186
See, e.g., Barron & Frug, supra note 52, at 267–69 (discussing the debate over local autonomy
and the ways in which it varies when talking about central cities or suburbs).
187
See Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 51, at 258 (noting the
unique opportunity local government provides citizens to participate in decision-making).
188
See, e.g., Blocher & Graff, supra note 98 (“Perhaps if local government were allowed to
engage in constitutional enforcement, more local government officials would be subject to election.
And more city attorneys might start taking public positions on substantive constitutional issues like
prayer in local schools or free speech in municipal parks. But there are reasons to doubt that the
constitutionalization of local politics would be a good thing. It could lead to significant mission creep,
distracting local government officials from traditional and vital functions like the nitty-gritty operations
of schools and parks themselves.”).
189
See Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities?, supra note 52, at 2546 (arguing
that the current weakened state of the mayoralty reflects, in part, a skepticism of democracy—and in
particular urban democratic power—and a belief in the ability of technocratic skill to correct for
political failures).
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190

to key municipal services.
And if we truly wish to respect the
experimental values of federalism, we may have to let some cities make
non-optimal resource allocations.191 Finally, we already expect city lawyers
to be experts in many of the areas of law that would likely be at play in
associational litigation—for example, civil rights—simply from the
defense perspective, such that cities can only be heard to deny, rather than
support, the rights and interests of their residents.192 Associational standing
would allow cities to use that expertise both offensively and defensively.
Some have also worried that engaging in controversial actions like
affirmative litigation can act as a signaling device to current and
prospective city residents, undermining solidarity, driving out dissenters,
and ultimately increasing homogenization in cities.193 This is undoubtedly
a significant concern. The well-rehearsed downsides of the risk of local
parochialism are real,194 and could readily apply to local policies evidenced
through litigation. I pause to make two observations. First, such signaling
already goes on—and not just at the local level. Nearly all socially
controversial government actions can be interpreted as partially motivated
to assure some particular group that the government has their interests in
mind. The controversy over cities adopting ordinances on both sides of the
immigration debate, for example, comes to mind.195 (The same objection
readily applies to policies and litigation at the state level, where leaving a
hostile community may be even less feasible.196) Second, while the
downsides are substantial, there may be a small silver lining: insofar as we
endorse a “sorting” theory of local government, it may be possible for
cities to use stances on controversial social issues to increase residents’
solidarity with their hometown, improving the “stickiness” of its human

190
See Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices,
supra note 104, at 62 (“[W]asting public funds creates bad publicity, to say the least, and leads to a
decline in political support.”).
191
See Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, supra note 139, at
1072–73 (highlighting local decision-making issues in the enforcement of immigration laws).
192
Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, supra note 60, at 39–42 (making this
point in the specific context of constitutional rights and constitutional litigation).
193
See Blank, supra note 143, at 557 (noting the potential “loss of solidarity”); Blocher & Graff,
supra note 98 (describing the mechanics of a constitutional “signaling device”); Rose, supra note 94, at
97 (noting that due to the relative option of choice in localities, cities must be careful of the reputations
they develop and not “frighten away desired citizens”).
194
Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1023–24 (2007) (noting that the downsides of local autonomy as
established in the literature include “that such autonomy in practice risks exacerbating economic, racial,
ethnic, and cultural divisions that local fragmentation engenders, can threaten individual liberties, and
may generate significant externalities on neighboring communities”).
195
Cf. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level, supra note 52, at 377–78.
196
See Rose, supra note 94, at 100–02 (“[S]ome residents may indeed be ‘stuck,’ unable to either
exit or to be heard . . . .”).
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197

capital and the corresponding financial resources.
Finally, Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have argued that
parens patriae standing in federal court should be substantially curtailed to
preserve the line between the government and individual rights, furthering
federalism values and accountability by redirecting states to sue in their
own courts.198 As to the first point, they contend that parens patriae cases
refashion public interests into a government “right” to curb or regulate
certain conduct on behalf of the political majority.199 This is a dangerous
shift, they suggest, from the framework in which only individuals have
rights, as against the government.200 Although not eliminating them
altogether, municipal associational standing would seem to reduce such
concerns—after all, it is the concrete, individualized injury of city
residents (and not a generalized public interest) which lies at the heart of
the associational standing inquiry.
One might also argue, following Woolhandler and Collins’ line of
thought,201 that limiting cities to suing on residents’ behalf in state court
would increase accountability. This is particularly so because state courts
and legislatures are the primary identifiers of local government authority.
If a city goes too far in state court, both the state courts and the state
legislature can readily discipline it. This rationale, however, places
unnecessary substantive limits on the claims that cities can pursue.
Moreover, under the current state of affairs, many impact and consumer
protection suits are brought by democratically unaccountable private
associations or class counsel. It thus seems likely that strengthening cities’
standing in federal court will improve, rather than dilute, accountability on
balance.202 Finally, allowing cities to sue in federal court might actually

197
Cf. Davidson, supra note 194, at 1013 (noting, in the context of federal-local cooperative
regulation, that “[f]ederal empowerment—again, often seen as destructive to local identity—can in fact
provide a means for local communities to retain, sharpen, and bolster that identity”).
198
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 25, at 443, 510–13; see also Merrill, supra note 32, at 304
(arguing that parens patriae suits should be exempt from ordinary standing rules when a sovereign sues
in its own courts, but not in those of other sovereigns).
199
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 25, at 445.
200
Id. at 444–45 (describing the disadvantages for defendants).
201
Id. at 443, 510–13.
202
Cf. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices,
supra note 104, at 62 (“Constituents should not have to choose between a governmental structure that
respects local prerogatives and one that permits their local law office to vindicate their rights under
state and federal law.”).
There may be reasons to think that a different alternative to both parens patriae and associational
standing might more optimally serve the interests of those persons on whose behalf each of these
institutions litigate. Nonetheless, I posit that for present purposes, it is important to compare the
possible outcomes of cities engaging in more representational litigation to the current system, rather
than to some idealized but as-yet-unidentified and untested system. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Information
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (critiquing the “nirvana” approach to
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reinforce and strengthen their identities as distinct political communities,
diffusing power more effectively through the multi-tiered government
system.203 Almost certainly, it would improve residents’ perceptions of the
city’s capacity to represent them and protect their interests—a sense of
authority that is hardly prevalent in the dominant narrative of local
governments.
D. Can Cities Sue Higher-Level Governments?
What happens when a city seeks to sue either its state or the federal
government—both of which also may speak on behalf of the very residents
the city is suing to protect? Fully addressing, for example, the possible
Eleventh Amendment and immunity problems is beyond the scope of this
Article. I will, however, note that there are at least two possible approaches
to the problem, and offer my perspective on the scope of the issue.
First, courts might conclude that, when a city sues under the rubric of
associational standing, it does not claim a sovereign interest in the matter
that conflicts with the parens patriae powers of the state or federal
government. Under that theory, municipalities could sue like any other
private association.
Alternatively, courts could place special restrictions on cities’ ability to
sue higher-level governments, acknowledging the close overlap between
other governments’ parens patriae authority and the role that a city plays
when it sues on behalf of its residents. When states sue as parens patriae,
they cannot always sue the federal government.204 When a city sues its
state, courts could consider whether a similar case would be allowed to
proceed in state court according to the ordinary Eleventh Amendment
analysis. In other words, the court would assess what components of state
economic analysis, which often presents “the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing
‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement”).
203
Cf. Massey, supra note 37, at 275–76 (arguing that allowing Congress to grant states standing
to litigate generalized quasi-sovereign interests furthers the separation of powers by allowing
federalism to act as an additional check on the executive branch).
204
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 n.17 (2007); Elliott, Standing Lessons, supra
note 61, at 579–81 (“[I]t has long been settled that states may not sue the federal government in parens
patriae . . . .”); Mank, supra note 37, at 1737, 1770 (discussing the majority opinion in Massachusetts
v. EPA); Wildermuth, supra note 25, at 317 (arguing that the requirement from Massachusetts v. EPA
that exempted certain claims from the bar of Massachusetts v. Mellon was based on a misreading of
Snapp); see also, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (“Nor does a State have
standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal
Government . . . .”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (“It cannot be conceded
that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States
from the operation of the statutes thereof.”). Interestingly, in 1985, then-Judge Scalia concluded that
this limitation was “prudential,” and could be waived by Congress. Md. People’s Counsel v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 760 F.2d 318, 321–22 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (treating the parens patriae power
in that suit as having been delegated to the state agency by Congress’ recognition of municipal interests
in underlying statute).
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sovereignty may have been properly delegated to a municipality as a
matter of state law.205
No matter how the issue is resolved, however, the substantial majority
of the suits brought based on associational standing will likely be against
private entities. This problem of governments suing governments, then,
should not drive the entirety of the doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal courts should willingly apply the doctrine of associational
standing to cities. To do so would improve transparency in the nature of
the rights and interests at stake in municipal litigation.206 Allowing cities
better access to courts would help fill in the enforcement gap between the
relief available to private associations and state actors’ willingness to take
on contentious issues that impact city residents. Perhaps just as
importantly, it would rationalize an important corner of the law of
representational litigation. Allowing cities to regularly use associational
standing to sue on behalf of residents would correct the unique
disadvantage at which they have been placed with respect both to states
and to private, democratically unaccountable corporations.

205
See, e.g., City of New York v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 649, 651–52 (N.Y. 1995); Bergen Cnty.
v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 160 A.2d, 811, 817 (N.J. 1960) (collecting cases wherein cities cannot represent
residents in actions against states or state agencies, but not ruling out cities’ ability to represent their
residents in some other circumstances); Cami Fraser, Protecting Native Americans: The Tribe as
Parens Patriae, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 665, 692–93 (2000) (noting that Tribes’ parens patriae standing
does not automatically circumvent sovereign immunity).
206
Cf. Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, Municipal Firearm Litigation: Ill Conceived
from Any Angle, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2000) (noting that it is “beyond rational dispute” that
municipal firearm litigation actually rested on harm to municipal residents).

